This paper investigates the link between how firms govern the relationships with their counterparts in vertical networks and the likelihood of developing product and/or process innovation by reporting the results of a survey on Italian automotive suppliers. Results show that actors do not select coordination mechanisms according to the type of innovation activity carried out. Conversely, different patterns of governance emerge if one distinguishes between companies transacting downstream (e.g. a second tier supplier selling their components/systems to a first tier one) and upstream (e.g. a second tier supplier buying component/system by a third tier one). In the first case, firms are more likely to innovate with their counterpart when adopting contractual governance tools. In the second case, companies innovate with their counterpart when ?trust? and ?trust building practices? are in place. downstream (e.g. a second tier supplier selling their components/systems to a first tier one) and upstream (e.g. a second tier supplier buying component/system by a third tier one). In the first case, firms are more likely to innovate with their counterpart when adopting contractual governance tools. In the second case, companies innovate with their counterpart when "trust" and "trust building practices" are in place.
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the link between how firms govern the relationships with their counterparts in vertical networks and the likelihood of developing product and/or process innovation. Vertical networks form in industries in which the development of a complex product, service or process is performed by a "system integrator" firm (Brusoni et. al 2011) through a network of suppliers and sub-suppliers, often, organized in a pyramidal or tiered structure (Whitford, 2005) . Examples of such a structures can be found in the automotive (Dyer, 1996; Helper, 1990) , the aerospace (Rossetti & Choi, 2005; Smith & Tranfield, 2005) or the electronic (Langlois & Robertson, 1992) industries.
Despite the diffusion of distributed innovation process for organizing complex product innovation (Brusoni et al., 2001) , and the fact that extensive research has demonstrated the importance of involving external sources of innovation to boost firms' innovation performance (Chesbrough, 2003) , there is a lack of empirical studies providing a comprehensive account of the governance mechanisms at work in vertical networks and their impact on innovation outcomes. In fact, most literature on the governance of vertical innovation network is based on either an inductive approach to explore how governance is performed or tests hypotheses on the impact of specific governance mechanisms on innovation outcomes. For example, theory-building studies have shown the importance of informal coordination mechanisms vs. formal arrangements (Kim, 2014) , the role of product architecture in determining the appropriate coordination mechanisms (Langlois, 2002) , and inter-firm relational practices (Dyer & Singh, 1998) . However, no study has systematically investigated the relative importance and role of the full range of governance variables indicated as conducive of innovation outcomes in vertical networks. Moreover, very often the empirical focus of such studies has been on the orchestrators of the network (the "system integrators" or "Original Equipment Manufacturer" -OEM) and on the upper level of the typical tiered structure of vertical networks, often neglecting the specificities of the practices at lower tiers.
This research gap has consequences on innovation management practice and theory. For instance, very little is known on whether the governance mechanisms that the literature indicates are mutually excluding or complementary. This brings the risk for companies developing complex products of employing an inconsistent or limited set of governance tools. Similarly, no study addresses if the relative position in a tiered structure of vertical relationships combined with firm size influences the approach towards the relationship with the external sources of innovation.
Conversely, it has been showed that the governance toolkit (Whitford & Zirpoli, 2016) , innovation competences, and relative bargaining position (Robertson & Langlois, 1995) might influence the governance of vertical relationships. Notably, in vertical supply chains firms occupying different tiers have often very different characteristics. Also on this matter, very little is known and firms tend to converge over similar governance practices despite they face very different settings and governance challenges. This paper presents the results of a survey on Italian automotive suppliers investigating their innovation activity in relation to the inter-organizational relationships developed in the last three years with automakers and other automotive suppliers along the supply chain, i.e. how Italian automotive suppliers manage inter-organizational relationships in order to face innovation challenges effectively. The study is based on a unique database on 1956 automotive suppliers developed through a National research project (National Observatory on Automotive Suppliers), who were all invited to participate in the survey. Results are based on 332 complete questionnaires, a subset of the 415 valid responses received, through which we investigated firms' innovation activities, inter-organizational relationships, and governance arrangements.
The results of the study are in many respects counter-intuitive. In the first place, actors do not select coordination mechanisms according to the type of innovation activity carried out by the firm (notably a key variable that literature indicates as determining the optimal governance mode).
Conversely, different patterns of governance emerge if one distinguishes between inter-firm relationships developed with clients vs. the ones developed with suppliers. In the first case, companies operating primarily downstream (e.g. a second tier supplier selling their components/systems to a first tier one) were more likely of innovating with their counterpart when adopting contractual governance tools. The role of "trust" or "trust building practices" is not significant. In the second case, companies operating primarily upstream (e.g. a second tier supplier buying component/system by a third tier one) tend to innovate with their counterpart when "trust" and "trust building practices" are in place. Formal coordination mechanisms are negatively correlated. These results are discussed at length in section 4 below.
In the next section the paper presents the theoretical background of the study. Section 3 introduces the empirical investigation, describing data collection, analysis, and results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
INNOVATION NETWORKS AND THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE
The debate concerning innovative firms' boundaries and the role of external sources of innovation has a quite long tradition in industry studies (see, for example Womack, Jones, and Ross (1990) ). In complex industries characterized by technological uncertainty and heterogeneous knowledge bases (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001 ) innovation outcomes are increasingly dependent on collective action developed through a network of actors (Powell, Koput, & SmithDoerr, 1996) , and a company's success is tightly linked to that of its ecosystem (Iansiti & Clark, 1994 ).
In such contexts, literature has shown that forming an inter-organizational network brings gains from interacting with partners, such as improving learning process both exchanging pieces of information and internalizing each other's knowledge (Podolny & Page, 1998) . These benefits have been found particularly relevant in presence of dispersed (among different actors) complex knowledge and a rapidly changing environment (Powell et al., 1996) . Ahuja (2000) , for example, studying chemical firms' patenting activity, showed that their innovation rates were positively related to the number of relationships firms had with other organizations that were interconnected themselves, underscoring the role played by a firm's ecosystem. As far as the involvement of external sources of innovation in complex product development, the positive relationship between vertical networks formation and innovation performance has been a cornerstone in innovation studies: starting from early systematic evidence gathered in the automotive industry (e.g. Clark e Fujimoto, 1991) , such a positive relation has been consistently found over time and across industries (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & Neely, 2004) .
However, accessing external knowledge in innovation networks brings a complication for governance. The main source of such complication is that the object of exchange cannot be specified ex ante, leaving room for opportunistic behaviors to trading parties. Once the relationship is started, i.e. at the moment in which innovation tasks are outsourced, the two parties can neither write complete contracts nor rely on market type/spot relationships, as they must cooperate to carry out innovation tasks (Smitka 1991; Lamming 1993; Nishiguchi 1994; Helper e Sako 1995; Sako 2004) . Not surprisingly, the early literature on network focused on why and when such organizational solution outperforms vertical integration (Robertson & Langlois, 1995) and to what extent the network form is a distinctive form of organization (Powell, 1990) . Literature has now consolidated some theories on network governance. In what follows, the main results on governance research and the related constructs and variables are presented together with a zoom into the studies that have specifically addressed governance matters in the automotive industry, which is the object of this study.
Coordination mechanisms
Discussing governance of inter-firm relationships the literature identified two main categories of coordination mechanisms, assessing their effectiveness in different organizational contexts: formal and informal. Formal mechanisms are those organizational arrangements that address inter-firm interactions towards structured and pre-defined paths, whose main instance is represented by contracts. One consolidated stream of literature investigating such formal mechanisms is that about "contracts for innovation" (Gilson, Sabel, & Scott, 2009) . As discussed by the authors, such contracts are different from contracts regulating transactions, since often what is at the center of the exchange between the parties is not and cannot be defined precisely ex ante. It is for this reason that the two parties use the contract to manage contingencies deriving from this specific relational situation. It is interesting to note that these studies are rooted in the so called learning-bymonitoring approach proposed by Sabel (1996) : Helper, MacDuffie, and Sabel (2000) highlighted that in collaborative buyer-supplier relationships the two parties were setting some "pragmatic mechanisms" (Helper et al., 2000, p. 445) which allowed them to learn both from and about each other, creating "an information symmetricizing machine in which actors must keep one another abreast of their inventions and capacities" (Helper et al., 2000, p. 472) . Following these findings, contracts for innovation were found to be the formalization of such practices, which enabled firms to develop joint innovation projects while monitoring partners.
Informal mechanisms, as opposed to formal ones, are those mechanisms that allow firms to coordinate common actions without any formal rule of interaction. The origins of studies focused on informal mechanisms can be traced back to the literature on Italian districts (Brusco, 1999) which addressed those specific social mechanisms for coordinating firms as "the rules of the game" that, as noted by Schrank and Whitford (2011) , "are not simply the laws of contract but that instead lie in a set of understandings and practices explicitly propagated, legitimated, and enforced by business associations, unions, and other regional institutions" (Schrank & Whitford, 2011, p. 157) .
Another investigative perspective on informal governance mechanisms of inter-firm relationships is that of embeddedness (Brusco, 1999; Russo & Natali, 2009) , which analyzed how the social structure within which firms are immersed may be at the bases of inter-firm coordination. These contexts are defined by Uzzi (1997) as spaces of interaction in which "information transfer is more fine-grained, tacit, and holistic than the typical price data of pure market exchanges, and joint problem-solving arrangements promote voice rather than exit. On a microbehavioral level, actors follow heuristic and qualitative decision rules, rather than intensely calculative ones, and they cultivate long-term cooperative ties rather than narrowly pursue self-interest." (Uzzi, 1997, p. 61) .
Another important wave of studies on informal mechanisms is that concerned with trust. (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003) distinguish between trust's direct effects and enabling effects (McEvily et al., 2003, p. 91) . Direct effects associate trust to a coordination mechanism activated through communication, conflict management, and negotiation processes. Enabling effects, on the contrary, are those related to the conditions of positive attitude towards partners that allow firms to get certain organizational outcomes, such as cooperation or innovation. From this second point of view, trust is interpreted as a complementary condition which fosters the effectiveness of other basic coordination mechanisms (Grandori & Soda, 1995) . On the whole, the first perspective interpreting trust as a coordination mechanism is the dominant approach adopted by organizational literature (Moretti, 2017).
Variables affecting coordination mechanisms
The variables affecting the choice of formal vs. informal coordination mechanisms are substantially of two kinds: (1) variables that relate to the type of innovation activity to be carried out, i.e. the object of exchange and (2) variables that link to the nature of external party's contribution to innovation. As far as the object of exchange is concerned, the higher the complexity of the system/components to be exchanged the higher the need of recurring to thick/informal relationships between the transacting parties (Brusoni, 2005) . As the object of exchange becomes a simpler component, firms can develop more formal up to "market-like" spot relationships (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997) . The modularization of component/system architecture is a key driver towards the recurrence to formal and market type relationships (Langlois, 2002) .
As far as the contribution of the external party to innovation is concerned, the literature on buyer-supplier relationships observed that when the external party has an important role in innovation (e.g. when an external supplier is involved at an early stage of development), the "adversarial/formal" supply chain model is not viable for practical reasons and a co-operative model is strongly recommended. Such alternative settings have for a long time been exemplified by (1) the "exit" 1 model, characterized by a high level of vertical integration and adversarial/formal relationships between OEM and suppliers, and (2) the "voice" model, also known as Japanese Style
Partnership (Helper & Sako, 1995; Lamming, 1993) associated with outsourcing and a relevant role of suppliers in innovation processes. Indeed, in the literature concerned with complex product innovation management, the discussion on the link between governance mechanisms and the nature of buyer-supplier relationships has de facto overlapped with the analysis of the Japanese style partnership (Dyer & Ouchi, 1998) .
The automotive industry
Distributed innovation processes based on the early involvement of suppliers in new product development activities (Helper, 1991a (Helper, , 1991b Helper & Sako, 1995; Lamming, 1993; Nishiguchi, 1994) have transformed the automotive industry that is nowadays characterized by a high level of fragmentation within the vertical activities of the supply chain and a tiered structure (Jacobides, MacDuffie, & Tae, 2016) . Lean product development (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) and outsourcing have not only impacted OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturer) practices towards first tier suppliers (asked to provide whole systems and modules), it has also pushed first tier suppliers themselves to outsource innovation activities to second and third tiers suppliers (through upstream collaborative innovation processes), exploding the ramification of the vertical network of automotive suppliers.
The governance of the buyer-supplier relationships has been substantially influenced by the so called "Japanese style partnerships". Suppliers' are differentiated along the supply-chain (Dyer, 1996) , so to form a pyramidal structure. Differentiation of suppliers' typology and buyer-supplier relationships was then associated to the recurrence to different coordination mechanisms: suppliers of low value-added components interacted through occasional relations and market-based mechanisms, while suppliers of modules and systems tended to develop close partnerships with carmakers (downstream collaborative innovation). Between these two extremes existed a continuum of types of relationships and governed through different coordination mechanisms (Calderini & Cantamessa, 1997; Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Kamath & Liker, 1994) . Figure 1 represents the automotive industry supply-chain, organized as a vertical network with the client (OEM) at the vertex, and a pyramid of suppliers positioned at different tiers. Distributed innovation processes, which are the object of the present work, may be developed following upstream or downstream directions, where the former indicates firms (first or second tier) developing innovation projects in collaboration with suppliers positioned at subsequent levels of the supply-chain (third, fourth, and following), while the latter describes the opposite direction (see Figure 1 ).
THE STUDY

The setting: the Italian automotive industry
The Italian automotive industry is characterized by a significant fragmentation of the supply system in a plethora of small and medium size firms, highly specialized on small phases of the production process, and with very different attitudes towards innovation activities. Integrating knowledge for innovation purposes is then one of the more problematic challenges of the Italian automotive supplier network, pushed by the industry evolution towards the development of a complex and articulated network of inter-organizational relationships (see for an overview Whitford and Zirpoli, 2016 , Enrietti and Whitford, 2005 , Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002 . In the last decade, in fact, the national carmaker (Fiat now Fiat Chrysler Automobiles), whose production choices deeply affected all small and medium suppliers, decided to reduce dramatically internal production levels 2 .
From 2006 to 2015, FCA cars production in Italy diminished from 878,747 to 666,694, thus in 10 years the internal cars production suffered a reduction of about 24%. In this period, the internal production level reached a minimum point in 2013, in which FCA produced 391,550 cars in Italy (-55% from 2006) 3 . This raised the need for suppliers to re-organize the whole production network, and to be attractive for foreign clients. This attention to foreign markets is confirmed by data about 
Sample
The present study is part of a larger research project developed at the national level by XXXXXXX (blinded for peer review). The project was started in 1997 with the aim of providing the annual picture of the Italian Automotive Industry, and in particular of the thousands of small and medium enterprises (the highest concentration of which is in the Turin and Piemonte area) depending on the national carmarker (Fiat, now FCA). In the last two editions, the National Observatory has focused part of the research on the issues of innovation and inter-firm relationships. Data used for our analysis come from the 2016 edition of the National Observatory on the Italian Automotive Suppliers, developed on 1956 Italian firms.
The directory used for inviting firms to participate to the study represents the most complete database on Italian automotive suppliers, developed and updated annually by the National Observatory with contact and background information on firms operating in the industry, and with firms entering or exiting the industry (or the market). The updating process is developed partly by means of the national registry of firms using the ATECO 2007 codes 5 linked to automotive suppliers, and partly by a direct intervention of the national industrial association of automotive suppliers, assuring the best approximation of the definition of the population of Italian firms working in the automotive industry.
The invitation to participating to the study was sent out in late May 2016 and was addressed to the managing director of the firm or to the contact person within the firm (who participated to previous editions of the study, who expressed the interest in participating to the observatory, etc.) when available. The survey was performed through an online questionnaire developed on the Qualtrics platform (www.qualtrics.com). Each company was contacted via a customized email message containing the invitation and the personal link to access the questionnaire. The link worked also for completing the questionnaire in separate sessions, giving respondents time to get all the information required to answer to more specific questions. Following Dillman's techniques (Dillman, 1991 (Dillman, , 2000 , the first invitation was followed by three recall by email (the first one three weeks after the initial email-out, the second one after ten days, and the last one after one week), and then a recall by phone (starting from firms that had partially completed the questionnaire, and then calling all firm in the directory) in order to maximize the response rate. The data gathering campaign resulted in 851 responses (43.5% initial response rate), among which 415 valid questionnaires (21.2% response rate). From the valid questionnaires, the boundaries of the investigation were restricted only to firms involved in the main automotive supply-chain, thus excluding car bodyworkers, garages, equipment manufacturers, and limiting the observatory to the four following categories:
− Integrators of modules and systems, representing producers of systems and/or modules that are placed at the top of the chain, whose direct customers are carmakers;
− Specialists, which represent producers of parts and highly specific and innovative components; usually specialists supply systems and modules integrators or directly the carmaker.
− Subcontractors can be identified with producers of standardized parts and components designed by customers, and typically (but not necessarily) position themselves as third level (or below) suppliers.
− Engineering & Design activities, namely those companies dedicated to the engineering development of product and process.
The final data set is composed by 332 questionnaires. The final sample was tested for nonresponse bias, controlling especially for firms' dimensions (employees and turnover) given the focus of the present study on innovation and inter-firm relationships, two issues that can be particularly sensitive to firm size. There were no statistically significant differences at the 95% confidence level between respondents and non-respondents on both variables, running a two-tailed t-test on turnover (p-value=0.38) and employees (p-value=0.08).
Data collection
The questionnaire used to collect our data was composed by three main sections, encompassing three different subjects:
-The first section comprised the general description section of the company, and was carried on from the questionnaire used in the former editions of the National Observatory,
-The second section was focused on innovation activities, and the questions were taken from the Community Innovation Survey (developed by the European Commission and submitted by all Member States to firms belonging to all sectors),
-The third and last section was devoted to the investigation of inter-organizational relationships, structured on the basis of international literature on inter-firm relationships (among others, Gilson et al. (2009); Granovetter (1985) ; Sabel (1996) ; Uzzi (1997); Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998) ).
For an overview of questions and scales used in the questionnaire, see Table 1 . References to scales developed by previous literature are provided when available.
In order to control for potential common method bias, both procedural and statistical remedies, following Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) were adopted. Regarding procedural remedies, the study follows all suggestions provided by Podsakoff and coauthors, except for the indication of using different data sources for dependent and independent variables: in our case, in fact, dependent and independent variables could be measured only through surveying directly firms under analysis, as we will explain in detail in the following section dedicated to variables' construction. Nevertheless, the survey was built according to the following procedural remedies to common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 887; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012, p. 
548):
− methodological and proximal separation between dependent variable and predictors, using different response formats and putting the questions in different places of the questionnaire, separating even "physically" the questions locating them in different web-pages (respondents had to click the "save & continue" button);
− temporal separation, respondents could save their answers and continue the survey in a different moment: 34% of respondents completed the survey in one session (25% on average in 26 minutes, 9% on average in 45 minutes), and 66% completed the survey in different sessions (11% in the same day, 55% in different days);
− respondents' anonymity was protected by reducing evaluation apprehension, by means of customized individual links to the online survey;
− question order was counterbalanced by distributing items used to build the dependent variable across different questionnaire sections (allowing also consistency checks) and proposing questions about independent variables across all questionnaire's sections;
− where available, the study employs scale items tested and consolidated by previous literature (see Table 1 ); where there were not consolidated scales, wording was revised together with industry and academic experts in order to assure the clearest formulation possible for each question. Where questions used technical terminology (as in the case of questions regarding innovation), the questionnaire provides definitions and explanations of terms and concepts.
A preliminary test of the survey on 5 firms of the sample and a focus group with experienced managers and academics helped (1) to eliminate ambiguity (wording, ordering, technical access to the online questionnaire), (2), to verify the effectiveness of the questionnaire in measuring the constructs of interest and (3) to control at best for common method bias.
As far as the latter is concerned, following Podsakoff et al. (2012) , the study addressed the issue of common method bias also using statistical remedies. Depending from the specificities of one's analysis, different statistical procedures are indicated as more apt to explore potential bias coming from the research approach. In the specific, given the extensive attention devoted to common method bias during the research design, and the multiplicity of procedural remedies adopted, the Harman's one-factor (or single-factor) was used as a diagnostic technique, in order to detect if the procedural remedies adopted were effective in limiting potential common method bias. In line with previous studies (Andersson & Bateman, 1997; Aulakh & Gencturk, 2000) an exploratory factor analysis and the examination of the unrotated solution were performed, in order to define how many factors were necessary to explain variance in the analyzed variables. In this procedure, main assumptions were that "if a substantial amount of common method variance is present, either (a) a single factor will emerge from the factor analysis or (b) one general factor will account for the majority of the covariance among the measures." (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 889) . The total variance for a single factor was .44, thus below the threshold of .50 traditionally indicated as the level over which could exist a problem of common method bias. Results suggest that procedural remedies adopted were sufficient to eliminate potential problems linked to common method bias.
Model specification and variable construction
The logit regression model developed for the present study assumes the following formulation:
p(x)≡P(y=1|x)=G(xβ)
where
and G(.) is the cumulative distribution function which maps !"
into the response probability (Wooldridge, 2001 ).
On this formulation the paper presents two regression models in which the dependent variable was the innovation developed in cooperation with a customer (downstream cooperative innovation, model 1), and a supplier (upstream cooperative innovation, model 2).
The models comprehend usual control variables (Tomlinson, 2010) used in the realm of the governance of innovation cooperative relationship. A summary of all variables is presented in Table   1 , and they are considered in further detail below.
Dependent variables: Cooperative Innovation
In order to assess firms' innovation activity, the study follows the formulation of the Community Innovation Survey, the Eurostat survey designed to monitor European firms' innovation activities in all industrial sectors. Eurostat has run the survey for almost 20 years, and its results are vastly used in academic research (Battisti & Stoneman, 2010; Frenz & Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Hashi & Stojčić, 2013) . Being the questionnaire periodically revised, questions formulation and scales used are now a reference point for innovation surveys. As the Italian formulation of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS 6 ) tests most questions related to the present study, the latter mutates from CIS as many questions as possible by using the same exact formulation (see Table 1 ). Through these questions, the paper identifies two binary variables measuring if the firm has developed innovative products and processes in the last three years. Given the focus of the present work on the governance of cooperative innovation, the dependent variables are built distinguishing those firms that developed their innovation activity in cooperation with a customer (downstream cooperation), and/or with a supplier (upstream cooperation), as depicted by Figure 1 7 . In the formulation within the logit model, "1" is the successful outcome (firms that developed at least one product or process innovation in cooperation with a partner), while "0" is the unsuccessful outcome (firms that did not developed a product or process innovation).
Independent variables: governance of inter-firm relationships
In order to investigate how firms govern their inter-firm relationships the study hinges on previous literature that investigates how formal and informal arrangements may influence the success of inter-firm relationships (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998) . Five constructs capture the palette of possible governance arrangements of inter-firm relationships: two of them describing a contractual governance posture ("network contract", "formal relationships"), three describing a social governance posture ("joint practices", "Information and knowledge sharing", "trust"). Respondents were explicitly asked to refer to the most relevant inter-firm relationship for their business while answering to the governance questions. All constructs are described below in details.
------------------------------------------
6 Source of information on the Italian Institute for Statistics (ISTAT): https://www.istat.it/en/archive/35223. 7 Given the focus of this study, the focus is only on vertical and horizontal cooperative innovation. The authors acknowledge that this choice prevents the consideration of other types of cooperative innovation, such as horizonal relationships and "external" relationships, such as those with universities, research centers, and other similar institutions. Nevertheless, the main goal of the paper is to investigate mainly supply-chain relationships, and to deepen our understanding of how client-supplier governance arrangements influence innovation activities.
Insert Table 1 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Network contract
This variable describes a very country-specific form of inter-firm relationship governance, the so-called "network contract" (Italian law 33/2009), which allows firms to formally constitute a network of autonomous and independent firms. The contract rules rights and duties of firms participating in the network and determines rules and procedures to develop joint activities in order to reach collective goals. The network contract is a specific form of contractual governance arrangement that can be used to govern cooperative innovation activities. Usually it is designed to govern network relationships more than dyadic ones. In the present model, this is a dummy variable assuming value 1 when the firm governed cooperative innovation relations through the network contract.
Formal mechanisms
Firms were asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale if they agreed or not in defining their governance approach "formal". A binary variable describes the exclusive use of formal mechanisms such as contracts (different from the network contract described above) and other forms of formalization of interactions, such as the definition of formal practices and routines of interaction.
Joint practices and Information & Knowledge sharing
Following the literature on the learning-by-monitoring and pragmatic collaborations (Helper et al., 2000; Sabel, 1993 Sabel, , 1996 Sabel & Zeitlin, 2004) , we built two constructs describing the governance of inter-firm relationships through organizational practices and routines. These variables are the resulting two components emerging from an exploratory factor analysis concerning seven items about organizational practices and routines developed by the two partners of the collaborative relationships. The scales got high reliability, scoring respectively 0.91 and 0.76
Cronbach's Alpha.
Trust
Following McEvily et al. (2003, p. 91) trust was included among the governance mechanisms that a firm can adopt in managing collaborative innovation (see also above for references on trust as a coordination mechanism). Trust was measured according to Zaheer et al. (1998) 's, who investigated explicitly inter-organizational trust. The items used to build the construct are presented in Table 1 . The Cronbach's alpha for the trust scale is 0.76.
Control variables
As suggested by previous literature, firms' internal resources are positively related to firms' innovation performance (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tomlinson, 2010; Tomlinson & Fai, 2013) . The present study includes variables controlling for firm's internal resources such as turnover, firm size, percentage of graduate employees, and percentage of R&D employees. Moreover, given the specificities of the automotive industry, which encompasses suppliers belonging to very different industrial sectors, and whose architecture has a very specific vertical network structure, the study considers also the firm's activity categorization and the firm's supply-chain position as two additional control variables. All variables are described in details in Table 1. 3.5 Descriptive statistics Table 2 provides descriptive statistics, and Table 3 provides binary correlations between variables.
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Mean scores of cooperative innovations show that downstream cooperation is generally more common and, in particular, process innovation developed with customers is developed more frequently than product innovation.
Pairwise correlations show how the independent variables are significantly correlated to each other, as expected. All other significant correlations proposed by table 3 are quite modest. In order to rule out possible multi-collinearity concerns, tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) were computed, two measures commonly used to assess potential problems of model specification. In this case, all regressors have tolerance > 0.1 (and corresponding VIF < 10), showing that the models do not raise multicollinearity concerns.
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Results
The analysis presented above was performed to shed light on how different governance mechanisms may influence the likelihood of developing product or process innovation in a collaborative relationship upstream or downstream the supply-chain (see Figure 1) . Results are summarized in Table 4 .
------------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here.
-------------------------------------------
Comparing product and process collaborative innovation developed downstream or upstream, the first interesting result is that firms' collaborative innovation performance is explained by the same governance variables, or at least belonging to the same governance posture. Moreover, their (positive or negative) impact on innovation performance is also consistent within downstream or upstream collaborative innovation relationships, showing coefficients with very similar magnitude.
Conversely, the study shows that governance arrangements associated with positive innovation outcomes are different when comparing upstream and downstream collaborative innovation relationships, devoted to product or process innovation projects.
8
The model investigating downstream product innovation, in fact, shows a significant and positively correlated coefficient for formal organizational arrangements (+0.266 with p < 0.10). The other main formal mechanism within the contractual posture, shows a positive and significant coefficient of the variable "network" (+0.297 with p < 0.05): the network contract, in fact, is a clear and transparent governance framework of inter-firm relationships, through which firms define in detail which are the rules of cooperative relationships (without any normative constraints in setting more or less stringent rules of interaction). As anticipated, the model analyzing downstream cooperative process shows very similar results got in the case of product innovation. Also in this case, successful process innovations developed with clients are associated to clear governance framework, contractual coordination mechanisms as the network contract. In this case, governing the relationship through an informal mechanism such as trust, has even a detrimental effect on successful outcomes of collaborative innovation projects.
Results concerning upstream product innovation show that successful collaborative innovation projects are associated with governance arrangements belonging to the social governance posture.
Trust and Joint practices, in fact, are the significant variables positively associated with successful upstream product innovation (+0.425 with p < 0.01, and +0.344 with p < 0.05).
Moreover, formal relationships have a negative and significant impact (-0.287 with p < 0.10) on upstream collaborative innovation, reinforcing the idea that working together developing routines, joining staff members and teams, and developing trust between partners help to manage effectively innovation relationships with suppliers, which conversely could be affected negatively by the use of formal mechanisms of coordination. The model examining upstream cooperation for process innovation has only one significant and positive coefficient, that of trust (0.316 with p < 0.05). This result confirms the relevance of social mechanisms in governing the relationships with suppliers, but at the same time suggests how formal arrangements or a more pragmatic approach to collaborations are not significant in providing an explanation for the success of the collaborative innovation.
DISCUSSION
The first noteworthy result of the present work is that governance postures in collaborative projects do not depend on the object of exchange. In the specific, the study does not find any positive relationship between governance and innovation outcomes premised on some "superior" pairing with the type of components/system exchanged and/or the type of innovation (process vs. product) carried out in the relationship. Hence, the data do not confirm previous studies carried out in industries like the PC industry (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Gilson et al., 2009; Helper et al., 2000; Langlois & Robertson, 1989; Robertson & Langlois, 1995) and the bicycle industry (Galvin & Morkel, 2001 ). Moreover, the study does not provide support to the usual assumption that organizational architectures tend to mirror product architectures (Colfer, 2007; MacCormack, Rusnak, & Baldwin, 2008) , and that product features (architecture) shape inter-firm organizational settings (Sanchez, 1996, p. 73) . Conversely, empirical evidence provides confirmation for a view that suggests that there is 'no simple deterministic link between the type of product architecture and organization architecture' (Sako, 2003, p. 230) and supports recent empirical evidence (Cabigiosu, Zirpoli, & Camuffo, 2013; Helper et al., 2000; Zirpoli & Camuffo, 2009) showing how "technological determinism and analogy lead to a naïf view of a one-way influence of product architecture on inter-organizational relations and industry architecture, whereas the relationship between product and organizational architectures is two-way, and the degree of coupling between product components and the degree of coupling between organizations co-evolve and mutually influence each other" (Zirpoli & Camuffo, 2009, p. 251) . However, the results presented here require further specification, as the study was not designed with the specific purpose of testing such a hypothesis. Future empirical studies could be focused on a more in-depth investigation of the relationships between governance postures and specific features of the type of innovation activitywhich, in this work, has been exemplified through the distinction between product and process innovation 9 .
Empirical evidence leads to a second result that is in many respects counterintuitive and surprising:
when collaborating upstream (with suppliers operating in the phases the farthest from OEMs) the recurrence to social governance mechanisms is positively associated to innovation outcomes;
conversely, collaborating downstream (with suppliers closer to OEMs) is associated with innovation success only if contractual governance mechanisms are in place. Table 5 about here. Table 5 displays the main findings in graphical form distinguishing between "downstream" (with clients) and "upstream" (with suppliers) relationships on the one side, and contractual (formal and network) and social (trust and joint practices) postures, on the other. In the case of upstream 9 Further support to this intuition is provided by the fact that variables describing indirectly the type of innovation developed by firms (activity and supply-chain level) are not significant in our models.
innovation, social governance posture is (1) positively related to collaborative innovation outcomes while (2) the formalization of relationships may have a detrimental effect on collaborative innovation with suppliers. It is not possible to conclude that such arrangements are mutually excluding or complementary at the firm level (in fact, respondents were asked to focus on the most representative relationship and it cannot be excluded that firms opt for different arrangements in different projects/relationships). On the other hand, data show that in a specific project/relationship social and contractual posture are mutually exclusive. There might be many interpretations of such result. One explanation could be that formalization binds and constrains firms' interactions, thus limiting creativity exploitation by partners (Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006; Tsai, 2002) .
This happens in particular in relationship developed with suppliers, in which one can hypothesize that firms may have higher incentives in finding a flexible way to cooperate with other firms, being the final "customers" of the innovation project (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005) .
In the case of downstream innovation, only formal governance mechanisms are positively associated with collaborative innovation outcomes. One possible interpretation is that developing innovation projects with their clients, firms need to frame the collaborative relationship within a formal scheme of interaction, provided by a contract, namely the governance arrangement associated with the lowest risk of exploitation by partners of inter-firm collaboration (Grandori & Soda, 1995) .
Finally, also the fact that "suppliers" in a vertical network are usually positioned at lower levels (the farthest from OEMs), while "customers" are positioned at higher levels of the vertical network (closer to OEMs) might contribute to explain the different "postures" in the observed relationships.
Usually, an automotive supply-chain (see figure 1 above) sees a high bargaining power at higher levels of the pyramid (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Hatch, 2004; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Wognum, Fisscher, & Weenink, 2002) , and high competition at lower levels of the network (Whitford, 2005, p. 59) . Suppliers working at tiers farther from OEMs feel a higher competitive pressure since they are more numerous and substitutable, while big suppliers operating close to the vertex can exert their power in negotiations with suppliers at lower levels. This situation can explain the results suggesting that suppliers collaborating downstream need a more formal governance posture to get positive outcomes from their collaborative innovation relationships, having clear and defined ways of interaction that reduce the risk of being exploited by partners (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Tsai, 2002) .
As far as the result that associates social governance posture with the positive outcome of upstream collaborative innovation, a possible interpretation is that suppliers positioned closer to OEMs carry out most design and engineering innovation. As a consequence, they have more difficulties in providing complete specifications of the object of exchange to their suppliers, i.e. formalization through contracts cannot fulfill coordination needs. In such a situation, a social governance posture is the one associated with positive innovation outcomes, since it leaves more space for free exchanges outside formal and pre-defined lines of interaction (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Jansen et al., 2006; Tsai, 2002) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented empirical evidence on how firms govern the relationships with their counterparts in vertical networks and the likelihood that the governance of the relationship influences product and/or process innovation outcomes. The present work was designed to contribute to the literature by providing large-scale empirical evidence on the question and fill an empirical gap. For many years, after the seminal work of the IMVP program (see Womack et al. (1990) ), the link between relationship governance and innovation has been largely explored either theoretically (e.g. Gilson et al. (2009) ) and/or through in depth case studies (e.g. Helper et al. (2000) Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002) missing a comprehensive account of the governance mechanisms at work in vertical networks and their impact on innovation outcomes premised on a more extensive data gathering process. The results presented here contrast with the literature that has found a link between the object of the transaction, the governance postures and innovation performance.
Moreover, the paper presents novel evidence concerning the different patterns of governance that emerges if one distinguishes between companies transacting downstream and upstream. These results have the potential of opening up new avenues for empirical and theoretical research for explaining network functioning and evolution.
The study also presents limitations. The data are gathered in one industry and in one country. Being the automotive industry organized as a vertical network, relationships between client and suppliers, and between suppliers at different levels of the production network, can be affected by the hierarchical industry structure in the perception of opportunism and power relations, both relevant concepts for our work. Moreover, data coming from Italian suppliers might be too idiosyncratic given the fact that, differently from other countries producing automobiles (e.g. US, Japan, France, Germany), Italy has only one OEM that, in many respect, brought some development of its vertical network that has not been observed elsewhere (see Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002 for an overview).
Replicating the study in other countries would improve the generalizability of our results, at least in the automotive industry. b) The partner may use opportunities that arise to profit at our expense.* c) Based on past experience, we cannot with complete confidence rely on the partner to keep promises made to us.* d) We are hesitant to transact with the partner when the specifications are vague.* e) The partner is trustworthy f) During the past year how often were there significant disagreements with the partner* g) The overall partner's performance is excellent 5-points Likert scale (*reverse coding). Additive combination (7-35). Cronbach's alpha: 0.76 1)-4) item a) are based on Community Innovation Survey 2010, Eurostat. 5) is based on the Italian Observatory on Automotive suppliers 2015. 12) was measured through a 5-points Likert scale and categorized in a binary variable where 0:1-2 points, 1:3-5 points. 13) and 14) are the result of an EFA. 15) items belong to the trust scale developed by Zaheer et al. (1998) based on the work by Rempel, Holmes, and Zanna (1985) Non-standardized regression coefficients (errors in brackets).* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Figures and Tables
